Major Cases and Applications (Copy)
1. Offer and Acceptance Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Storer v Manchester City Council | A clear, definite statement showing willingness to be bound can be an offer. | One party sends clear terms and only acceptance is needed. | “This is likely an offer because the terms appear clear and certain, similar to Storer.” |
| Gibson v Manchester City Council | Vague wording or negotiation is not an offer. | Words like “may be prepared to sell” or uncertain language. | “The wording suggests negotiation rather than an offer, as in Gibson.” |
| Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co | An advert can be a unilateral offer if it promises reward for performance and shows intention to be bound. | Reward, promotion, “do this and get this.” | “This resembles Carlill because performance of the stated act accepts the offer.” |
| Fisher v Bell | Display of goods is usually an invitation to treat, not an offer. | Goods displayed in a shop/window. | “The display is likely only an invitation to treat, so the customer makes the offer.” |
| Pharmaceutical Society v Boots | Goods on shelves are invitations to treat; customer makes offer at checkout. | Self-service shop/supermarket. | “The offer occurs when the customer presents the item for purchase.” |
| Partridge v Crittenden | Advertisements are generally invitations to treat unless wording suggests unilateral offer. | Advert selling goods generally. | “The advert is likely an invitation to treat, not an offer to the whole world.” |
| Harvey v Facey | A statement of price is not necessarily an offer. | One party merely gives price/information. | “The reply gives information only and does not show willingness to be bound.” |
| Hyde v Wrench | A counter-offer destroys the original offer. | Reply changes price, quantity, payment, or a core term. | “If this is a counter-offer, the original offer is destroyed under Hyde v Wrench.” |
| Stevenson v McLean | A mere enquiry does not reject the offer. | Party asks if terms can be changed, without insisting. | “This appears to be a mere enquiry rather than a counter-offer.” |
| Felthouse v Bindley | Silence cannot generally amount to acceptance. | One party says “if I hear nothing, I assume acceptance.” | “There is no acceptance because silence is not enough.” |
| Adams v Lindsell | Postal acceptance is effective when posted, not when received. | Acceptance sent by post and post is reasonable. | “The contract is formed when the acceptance letter is posted.” |
| Household Fire Insurance v Grant | Postal rule applies even if the acceptance letter is lost. | Letter posted but never arrives. | “Acceptance may still be effective even though it was not received.” |
| Entores v Miles Far East | Instant communication acceptance is effective when received. | Telex, email-style instant communication. | “Acceptance is effective on receipt, not sending.” |
| Brinkibon v Stahag Stahl | Instant communication rules depend on the circumstances. | Messages sent outside office hours/across time zones. | “The court will consider when and where the message should reasonably be treated as received.” |
| Taylor v Laird | A person cannot accept an offer without knowing about it. | Party performs act unaware of offer. | “There is no acceptance because the offeree was unaware of the offer.” |
| Williams v Carwardine | A person aware of a reward may accept even if their motive is not the reward. | Reward known, but person acts for another reason. | “Motive is irrelevant if the offeree knew of the reward.” |
| R v Clarke | If the offeree forgets or does not rely on the reward offer, there is no acceptance. | Person gives information without acting on reward. | “There is no acceptance because the act was not done in response to the offer.” |
| Routledge v Grant | Offer can be revoked any time before acceptance, unless supported by consideration. | Offer withdrawn before acceptance. | “The offeror may revoke before acceptance unless an option contract exists.” |
| Byrne v Van Tienhoven | Revocation must be communicated to be effective. | Offeror posts revocation but offeree accepts before receiving it. | “Revocation is ineffective until communicated.” |
| Dickinson v Dodds | Revocation can be communicated through a reliable third party. | Offeree learns from trusted source that offer is withdrawn/sold. | “The offeree had reliable notice of revocation, so acceptance may fail.” |
| Errington v Errington | In unilateral contracts, offer cannot usually be revoked once performance has begun. | One party starts performing required act. | “Once performance began, revocation would likely be unfair.” |
2. Intention to Create Legal Relations Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Balfour v Balfour | Domestic agreements between spouses are presumed not legally binding. | Husband/wife/family informal promise. | “The starting presumption is no legal intention because this is domestic.” |
| Merritt v Merritt | Presumption can be rebutted where spouses are separated and agreement is written/serious. | Separated spouses, written terms, property/money. | “The agreement is more likely binding because the parties were separated and acted formally.” |
| Jones v Padavatton | Family arrangements are usually not intended to be legally binding. | Parent-child support/education/living arrangement. | “This appears to be a family arrangement, so intention may be absent.” |
| Parker v Clark | Domestic presumption rebutted where serious reliance occurs. | One party sells house, moves, gives up rights, relies heavily. | “The seriousness and reliance suggest intention despite the family context.” |
| Simpkins v Pays | A social agreement can be binding if money, regularity and mutual expectation exist. | Lottery pool, shared winnings, social money arrangement. | “Although social, the financial arrangement suggests legal intention.” |
| Edwards v Skyways | Commercial agreements are presumed legally binding. | Business/employer/customer promise. | “The commercial context creates a strong presumption of legal intention.” |
| Esso Petroleum v Commissioners | Promotional schemes may have legal intention if commercial benefit exists. | Free gift/promotion linked to sales. | “The promotion is commercial, so intention is likely present.” |
| Rose and Frank v Crompton | Honour clauses can rebut commercial intention. | Agreement says “not legally binding” or “honour only.” | “The commercial presumption may be rebutted by the honour clause.” |
| Jones v Vernon Pools | Vague wording may prevent legal intention. | “Binding in honour only” / unclear obligation. | “The wording may show no intention to create legal relations.” |
| Kleinwort Benson v Malaysia Mining | Letters of comfort may not create binding obligations if not promissory. | Comfort letter, parent company assurance. | “The wording may be reassurance rather than a contractual promise.” |
3. Consideration Cases
Written and Compiled By Sir Hunain Zia (AYLOTI), World Record Holder With 154 Total A Grades, 11 World Records and 7 Distinctions, Educate A Change.
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Currie v Misa | Consideration means a benefit to one party or detriment to the other. | General definition needed. | “Consideration requires benefit or detriment, as defined in Currie v Misa.” |
| Thomas v Thomas | Consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate. | Small payment/token value. | “The court will not assess economic adequacy if legal value exists.” |
| Chappell v Nestle | Even trivial items can be good consideration if requested. | Wrappers/tokens/small acts requested as part of bargain. | “The act has legal value because it was requested by the promisor.” |
| White v Bluett | Consideration must have real legal value, not vague moral value. | Promise to stop complaining/behave well. | “This is too vague to amount to sufficient consideration.” |
| Tweddle v Atkinson | Consideration must move from the promisee. | Third party tries to enforce promise. | “The claimant cannot enforce because he gave no consideration.” |
| Dunlop v Selfridge | Only a party who provided consideration can enforce the contract. | Third-party enforcement issue. | “The promisee must have provided consideration.” |
| Roscorla v Thomas | Past consideration is not valid. | Promise made after act completed. | “The promise came after the act, so consideration is past.” |
| Re McArdle | Work done before promise is past consideration. | Family/property work done before payment promise. | “The work had already been completed, so the promise is unenforceable.” |
| Lampleigh v Braithwaite | Past act can be valid if done at promisor’s request with expectation of payment. | Request first, promise later, payment expected. | “The exception may apply because the act was requested.” |
| Re Casey’s Patents | Past consideration valid if both parties understood payment/reward would follow. | Services performed with implied expectation of payment. | “There was an implied understanding that the work would be paid for.” |
| Collins v Godefroy | Existing public duty is not consideration. | Witness/police/public official already legally required to act. | “Doing what one is already legally bound to do is not good consideration.” |
| Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan CC | Going beyond public duty can be consideration. | Police/public authority provides extra service. | “Extra performance beyond legal duty can amount to consideration.” |
| Ward v Byham | Performing a public duty may be consideration if practical benefit is given. | Parent already has duty but does something beneficial/requested. | “The act may still be sufficient because it gives practical benefit.” |
| Stilk v Myrick | Existing contractual duty is not good consideration. | Promise of extra pay for same work. | “No fresh consideration exists because the party only performed an existing duty.” |
| Hartley v Ponsonby | Going beyond existing contractual duty can be good consideration. | Work becomes more dangerous/extreme than original duty. | “The party went beyond the original duty, so consideration exists.” |
| Williams v Roffey Bros | Practical benefit can be sufficient consideration for extra payment. | Promise to pay more to complete work, promisor gains practical benefit. | “The promisor received practical benefit, so the promise may be enforceable.” |
| Pao On v Lau Yiu Long | Past act may be good consideration if requested, understood as paid, and enforceable if promised earlier. | Commercial request followed by later formal promise. | “The past act may still support the promise under the Pao On conditions.” |
| Pinnel’s Case | Part payment of debt is not satisfaction of the whole debt unless exception applies. | Debtor pays less than owed. | “Part payment alone does not discharge the full debt.” |
| Foakes v Beer | Confirms part payment of debt is not good consideration for promise to waive balance. | Creditor later claims remaining debt. | “The creditor may still claim the balance because part payment is insufficient.” |
| Hirachand Punamchand v Temple | Payment by a third party may discharge the whole debt if accepted as settlement. | Third party pays lesser amount. | “A third-party payment can create an exception to the part-payment rule.” |
| Central London Property Trust v High Trees | Promissory estoppel may prevent a party going back on a promise where relied upon. | Creditor promises to accept less and debtor relies. | “Promissory estoppel may prevent enforcement if going back would be inequitable.” |
| D & C Builders v Rees | Estoppel unavailable where pressure/inequitable conduct exists. | Debtor exploits creditor’s weakness. | “Estoppel is unlikely because the promise was obtained unfairly.” |
| Combe v Combe | Promissory estoppel is generally a shield, not a sword. | Claimant tries to sue using estoppel alone. | “Estoppel cannot usually create a new cause of action.” |
4. Terms and Classification Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Poussard v Spiers | Breach of condition allows termination and damages. | Major term breached, contract purpose defeated. | “The term is likely a condition because breach goes to the root of the contract.” |
| Bettini v Gye | Breach of warranty allows damages only. | Minor breach, main contract still possible. | “The breach is likely only of a warranty, so termination is unavailable.” |
| Hong Kong Fir Shipping v Kawasaki | Innominate term: remedy depends on seriousness/consequences of breach. | Term not clearly condition/warranty; effect varies. | “The court will ask whether the breach deprived the party of substantially the whole benefit.” |
| The Mihalis Angelos | Commercial time clauses may be treated as conditions. | Shipping/commercial time obligation. | “In commercial contracts, strict compliance with time may be essential.” |
| Schuler v Wickman | Court may reject the label “condition” if unreasonable in context. | Contract labels term but breach would make termination absurd. | “The label is relevant but not conclusive.” |
| Bunge v Tradax | Time stipulations in mercantile contracts are often conditions. | Late notice/delivery in trade contract. | “Commercial certainty supports treating the time term as a condition.” |
| Oscar Chess v Williams | Statement by non-expert seller may be representation, not term. | Private seller gives inaccurate information. | “The statement may not be a term because the maker lacked expertise.” |
| Dick Bentley v Harold Smith Motors | Statement by expert seller likely to be a term. | Dealer/expert makes statement about goods. | “The statement is more likely contractual because it came from an expert.” |
| Bannerman v White | Importance of statement to buyer can make it a term. | Buyer makes importance clear before contracting. | “The statement became a term because it was central to entering the contract.” |
| Routledge v McKay | Delay between statement and contract suggests representation, not term. | Statement made long before written contract. | “The delay weakens the argument that the statement was a term.” |
5. Exclusion Clause Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| L’Estrange v Graucob | A person who signs a contractual document is bound, even if they did not read it. | Signed/ticked terms and conditions. | “The party is likely bound because signing/ticking normally incorporates terms.” |
| Curtis v Chemical Cleaning | Misrepresentation of a clause can prevent reliance on it. | Clause explained falsely or incompletely. | “The clause may not bind because its effect was misrepresented.” |
| Olley v Marlborough Court Hotel | Exclusion clause must be brought to attention before or at contract formation. | Notice appears after contract formed. | “The clause is ineffective because notice was given too late.” |
| Chapelton v Barry UDC | Term on non-contractual document may not be incorporated. | Ticket/receipt given after payment. | “The ticket was merely a receipt, so the clause may not be incorporated.” |
| Parker v South Eastern Railway | Reasonable notice of ticket terms may incorporate clause. | Ticket refers to terms clearly. | “The issue is whether reasonable notice was given.” |
| Thompson v LMS Railway | Party may be bound if reasonable steps to give notice were taken. | Ticket clearly refers to conditions. | “Reasonable notice may bind the party even if they did not read it.” |
| Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking | Onerous clauses require greater notice before contract formation. | Harsh/unusual exclusion in machine/ticket context. | “The more onerous the clause, the clearer the notice required.” |
| Interfoto v Stiletto | Particularly unusual/onerous terms require special notice. | Hidden penalty/harsh term. | “The term may fail because special notice was not given.” |
| McCutcheon v David MacBrayne | Previous dealings incorporate terms only if consistent and known. | Parties dealt before, but not consistently. | “Previous dealings are insufficient unless regular and consistent.” |
| Hollier v Rambler Motors | Few occasional dealings are not enough to incorporate exclusion clause. | Rare past dealings. | “The previous course of dealing is too limited.” |
| Spurling v Bradshaw | Regular course of dealing may incorporate terms. | Repeated business transactions. | “The repeated dealings make incorporation more likely.” |
| Houghton v Trafalgar Insurance | Ambiguous exclusion clause interpreted against party relying on it. | Clause wording unclear. | “Any ambiguity will be read contra proferentem.” |
| Canada Steamship Lines v The King | Clauses excluding negligence must use clear words or clearly cover negligence. | Party excludes liability for damage/injury. | “The clause must clearly cover negligence to be effective.” |
| Photo Production v Securicor | Fundamental breach does not automatically invalidate exclusion clause; construction matters. | Serious breach + exclusion clause. | “The question is whether the clause, properly construed, covers the breach.” |
| George Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds | Reasonableness can limit exclusion clauses. | Exclusion clause seems commercially unfair. | “The clause may fail if unreasonable in context.” |
6. Consumer Rights Act 2015 Authorities
Written and Compiled By Sir Hunain Zia (AYLOTI), World Record Holder With 154 Total A Grades, 11 World Records and 7 Distinctions, Educate A Change.
| Authority | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRA 2015 s9 | Goods must be of satisfactory quality. | Faulty/poor quality goods. | “The goods may breach s9 if they fall below the standard a reasonable person would expect.” |
| CRA 2015 s10 | Goods must be fit for particular purpose made known to seller. | Buyer states purpose before purchase. | “The goods may breach s10 because the buyer made the purpose clear.” |
| CRA 2015 s11 | Goods must match description. | Goods differ from description/advert. | “The goods fail to match description under s11.” |
| CRA 2015 s49 | Services must be performed with reasonable care and skill. | Poor service/unsafe service. | “The trader may breach s49 by failing to use reasonable care and skill.” |
| CRA 2015 s62 | Consumer terms must be fair. | Harsh/unbalanced consumer term. | “The term may be unfair if it creates significant imbalance to the consumer’s detriment.” |
| CRA 2015 s65 | Cannot exclude liability for death/personal injury from negligence. | Injury caused by trader negligence. | “The clause is invalid for personal injury caused by negligence.” |
| CRA 2015 s68 | Written consumer terms must be transparent. | Hidden/unclear small print. | “The term may fail transparency if not plain and intelligible.” |
| CRA 2015 Schedule 2 | Grey list of potentially unfair terms. | Cancellation penalties, imbalance, unilateral powers. | “The term resembles a Schedule 2 unfair term.” |
7. Discharge by Performance Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cutter v Powell | Entire performance required before payment if contract is entire. | Party completes only part of agreed work. | “Payment may be denied because the contract required entire performance.” |
| Hoenig v Isaacs | Substantial performance allows payment minus cost of defects. | Work mostly completed but minor defects remain. | “The party may claim payment subject to deduction for defects.” |
| Bolton v Mahadeva | No substantial performance if defects are serious. | Work incomplete/defective in a major way. | “The defects are too serious, so substantial performance may fail.” |
| Ritchie v Atkinson | Divisible contracts allow payment for completed parts. | Contract split into units/stages. | “The contract may be divisible, allowing payment for the completed part.” |
| Sumpter v Hedges | Voluntary acceptance of partial performance may create payment obligation; forced acceptance does not. | One party leaves work incomplete and other uses it. | “Payment depends on whether the benefit was freely accepted.” |
| Planche v Colburn | If one party prevents completion, the other may claim quantum meruit. | Contract cancelled/prevented after work started. | “The claimant may recover reasonable payment because completion was prevented.” |
| Startup v Macdonald | Tender of performance can discharge obligation if refused. | Party tries to perform but other refuses. | “The party may be treated as having performed by valid tender.” |
8. Frustration Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Taylor v Caldwell | Contract frustrated where subject matter is destroyed without fault. | Venue/property essential to contract destroyed. | “The contract may be frustrated because the subject matter no longer exists.” |
| Jackson v Union Marine Insurance | Long delay may frustrate if it makes contract commercially different. | Delay destroys commercial purpose. | “The delay may make performance radically different.” |
| Krell v Henry | Contract frustrated where main purpose/event fails. | Contract made for event that does not occur. | “The foundation of the contract has disappeared.” |
| Herne Bay Steam Boat v Hutton | No frustration if some commercial purpose remains. | Event partly cancelled but other benefit remains. | “Frustration may fail because the contract still has commercial value.” |
| Davis Contractors v Fareham UDC | Mere difficulty, delay or extra expense is not frustration. | Performance becomes harder/costlier. | “The contract is not frustrated merely because performance is more expensive.” |
| Tsakiroglou v Noblee Thorl | Increased expense/alternative route usually not frustration. | Shipping route blocked but performance possible. | “Performance is still possible, so frustration is unlikely.” |
| Robinson v Davidson | Personal service contract may be frustrated by illness/incapacity. | Performer/employee becomes unable to perform. | “Illness may frustrate if personal performance was essential.” |
| Condor v Baron Knights | Employment/service contract may be frustrated by illness preventing performance. | Employee medically unable to continue. | “The contract may be discharged due to incapacity.” |
| Maritime National Fish v Ocean Trawlers | Self-induced frustration is not allowed. | Party’s own choice/action causes impossibility. | “The party cannot rely on frustration because the event was self-induced.” |
| Fibrosa v Fairbairn | Money paid before frustration may be recovered where there is total failure of consideration. | Money paid before frustrating event. | “Money paid may be recoverable where consideration totally fails.” |
| Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 s1(2) | Money paid before frustration recoverable; money due ceases, subject to expenses. | Advance payment/refund issue. | “Financial consequences are governed by s1(2).” |
| Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 s1(3) | Court may award sum for valuable benefit conferred before frustration. | One party gained benefit before frustration. | “A just sum may be awarded for benefit received.” |
9. Damages Cases
Written and Compiled By Sir Hunain Zia (AYLOTI), World Record Holder With 154 Total A Grades, 11 World Records and 7 Distinctions, Educate A Change.
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Robinson v Harman | Damages aim to put claimant in position as if contract performed. | General damages principle. | “The aim is compensation for the expected contractual benefit.” |
| Anglia Television v Reed | Reliance loss/wasted expenditure may be recovered. | Money spent preparing for contract. | “The claimant may recover wasted expenditure incurred in reliance on the contract.” |
| C & P Haulage v Middleton | Reliance loss may be limited where claimant would not have made profit. | Claimant tries to escape bad bargain. | “Reliance damages cannot be used to avoid a losing contract.” |
| Hadley v Baxendale | Loss recoverable if it arises naturally or was within contemplation of parties. | Remoteness issue. | “The loss must satisfy one of the two Hadley limbs.” |
| Victoria Laundry v Newman Industries | Ordinary lost profits recoverable; unusual losses need special knowledge. | Late delivery causing business profit loss. | “Normal profits may be recoverable, but special profits need communicated knowledge.” |
| The Heron II | Type of loss must be reasonably foreseeable/serious possibility. | Market loss caused by late delivery. | “The relevant type of loss must have been within reasonable contemplation.” |
| British Westinghouse v Underground Electric | Claimant must mitigate loss. | Claimant could have reduced loss. | “The claimant cannot recover avoidable losses.” |
| Pilkington v Wood | Claimant need only take reasonable mitigation steps. | Defendant argues claimant should have done more. | “The claimant is not required to take unreasonable steps.” |
| Addis v Gramophone | Damages generally not awarded for injured feelings in commercial/employment contract. | Mental distress claim in ordinary contract. | “Mental distress is usually not recoverable.” |
| Jarvis v Swan Tours | Damages for loss of enjoyment may be recoverable where contract’s object is pleasure. | Holiday/leisure contract ruined. | “Distress/loss of enjoyment may be recoverable because enjoyment was the contract’s purpose.” |
| Jackson v Horizon Holidays | Damages for disappointment/loss of enjoyment in holiday contract. | Family holiday/pleasure contract. | “Compensation may include disappointment where pleasure was central.” |
| Chaplin v Hicks | Loss of chance can be recoverable if chance has measurable value. | Lost opportunity due to breach. | “The claimant may recover for loss of a real chance.” |
| Ruxley Electronics v Forsyth | Cost of cure may be denied if disproportionate; loss of amenity may be awarded. | Defective performance but repair cost excessive. | “The court may award loss of amenity instead of disproportionate repair costs.” |
| Farley v Skinner | Damages for distress may be recoverable if peace of mind was important object. | Survey/contract intended to avoid disturbance. | “Distress may be recoverable where peace of mind was a major purpose.” |
10. Specific Performance and Injunction Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beswick v Beswick | Specific performance may be granted where damages are inadequate. | Promise cannot be properly compensated by money. | “Specific performance may be appropriate because damages are inadequate.” |
| Falcke v Gray | Specific performance may be granted for unique goods. | Rare/unique item/property. | “Damages cannot substitute for unique subject matter.” |
| Sky Petroleum v VIP Petroleum | Specific performance possible where goods are hard to obtain elsewhere. | Shortage/unique supply situation. | “Specific performance may be granted because substitute goods are unavailable.” |
| Co-op Insurance v Argyll Stores | Specific performance refused where constant supervision required. | Ongoing business operation required. | “The court is unlikely to order performance requiring constant supervision.” |
| Ryan v Mutual Tontine | Specific performance refused where performance requires continuous supervision. | Continuing obligation hard to monitor. | “The order may be refused due to supervision difficulties.” |
| Patel v Ali | Specific performance refused where it would cause undue hardship. | Defendant hardship after contract. | “Equity may refuse the remedy due to hardship.” |
| Page One Records v Britton | Courts reluctant to enforce personal service contracts. | Employment/artist/manager relationship. | “The court will not usually force personal service.” |
| Warner Bros v Nelson | Negative injunction may restrain working elsewhere, but not force direct employment. | Performer agrees not to work for others. | “A prohibitory injunction may be possible if it does not compel personal service.” |
| Lumley v Wagner | Injunction may restrain breach of negative promise. | Singer/performer agrees not to perform elsewhere. | “The court may enforce the negative covenant by injunction.” |
| American Cyanamid v Ethicon | Interim injunction test: serious issue, adequacy of damages, balance of convenience. | Temporary injunction before trial. | “An interim injunction depends on serious issue and balance of convenience.” |
| Doherty v Allman | Delay can defeat equitable remedy. | Claimant waits too long. | “Delay may bar the remedy because delay defeats equity.” |
11. Minors’ Contracts Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nash v Inman | Minor liable for necessaries only if suitable and actually needed. | Minor buys goods but already has enough. | “The goods may not be necessaries if the minor already had sufficient supply.” |
| Chapple v Cooper | Necessaries include essential services, not only goods. | Funeral/medical/basic living services. | “The contract may be enforceable as one for necessaries.” |
| Fawcett v Smethurst | Necessaries must still be reasonable and not overly harsh. | Minor enters unfair transport/hire term. | “The term may not bind the minor if it is harsh or unreasonable.” |
| Clements v London and NW Railway | Beneficial contracts of service are enforceable. | Employment/training contract benefits minor. | “The contract is enforceable if substantially beneficial to the minor.” |
| De Francesco v Barnum | Oppressive service contract not enforceable against minor. | Restrictive training/employment terms. | “The contract is not beneficial because it is oppressive.” |
| Doyle v White City Stadium | Contract may bind minor if overall beneficial despite some restrictions. | Sporting/employment contract with benefits. | “The contract may be enforceable if benefits outweigh restrictions.” |
| Proform Sports Management v Proactive Sports | Commercial representation contract may not be beneficial service contract. | Minor athlete management deal. | “This may not be enforceable if it is not truly beneficial service/training.” |
| Steinberg v Scala | Minor can avoid voidable contract but cannot recover money unless total failure of consideration. | Minor buys shares/long-term obligation. | “The minor may avoid future liability but may not recover past payments.” |
| Edwards v Carter | Voidable contract must be avoided before/within reasonable time after majority. | Minor waits too long after 18. | “The contract may become binding if not avoided in time.” |
| Corpe v Overton | Certain long-term contracts are voidable by minors. | Partnership/property/share-type obligation. | “The minor may avoid the contract because it is voidable.” |
| Minors’ Contracts Act 1987 s2 | Guarantees for minors’ contracts can be enforceable against adult guarantor. | Parent/adult guarantees minor’s debt. | “The guarantee may be enforceable against the adult guarantor.” |
| Minors’ Contracts Act 1987 s3 | Court can order restitution where just and equitable. | Minor still has property/benefit. | “Restitution may be ordered to prevent unjust enrichment.” |
12. Misrepresentation Cases
Written and Compiled By Sir Hunain Zia (AYLOTI), World Record Holder With 154 Total A Grades, 11 World Records and 7 Distinctions, Educate A Change.
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bisset v Wilkinson | Honest opinion is not a misrepresentation of fact. | Seller gives estimate/opinion without special knowledge. | “The statement may be opinion rather than fact.” |
| Smith v Land and House Property | Opinion by someone with superior knowledge may be treated as fact. | Expert/owner gives opinion implying facts. | “The opinion may amount to a factual representation.” |
| Dimmock v Hallett | Sales puff is not actionable misrepresentation. | Exaggerated advertising language. | “This is likely mere puff rather than a statement of fact.” |
| With v O’Flanagan | Statement true when made can become misrepresentation if circumstances change before contract. | Facts change and party stays silent. | “The representor should correct the earlier statement.” |
| Spice Girls v Aprilia | Conduct can amount to misrepresentation. | Party’s behaviour implies false fact. | “The conduct may create a false impression.” |
| Redgrave v Hurd | Misled party may rely on statement even if they could have checked truth. | Documents available but not checked. | “Failure to investigate does not prevent reliance.” |
| Attwood v Small | No misrepresentation if claimant relies on own investigation, not statement. | Independent verification relied upon. | “Reliance may fail because the claimant relied on their own checks.” |
| Derry v Peek | Fraudulent misrepresentation requires knowing falsity, no belief in truth, or recklessness. | Deliberate/reckless false statement. | “Fraud requires dishonesty or recklessness.” |
| Hedley Byrne v Heller | Negligent misstatement may create liability where special relationship exists. | Advice by professional/expert. | “Negligent misrepresentation may arise from careless expert advice.” |
| Howard Marine v Ogden | Representor must prove reasonable grounds for belief under negligent misrepresentation. | False statement made carelessly. | “The burden may fall on the representor to show reasonable belief.” |
| Royscot Trust v Rogerson | Damages for negligent misrepresentation may be assessed like fraud under Misrepresentation Act 1967 s2(1). | Negligent misrepresentation causing loss. | “Damages may be generous under s2(1).” |
| Leaf v International Galleries | Rescission may be barred by lapse of time. | Claimant delays discovering/acting. | “Rescission may be unavailable due to delay.” |
| Long v Lloyd | Affirmation bars rescission. | Claimant continues contract after discovering truth. | “The right to rescind may be lost by affirmation.” |
| Car and Universal Finance v Caldwell | Rescission can occur before communication if representor disappears. | Fraudster cannot be found. | “Rescission may still be effective if reasonable steps are taken.” |
13. Duress and Undue Influence Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Barton v Armstrong | Threats can amount to duress even if not the sole reason for the contract. | Threats of violence/serious pressure. | “Duress may exist if the threat was a reason for entering the contract.” |
| The Siboen and The Sibotre | Economic duress recognised in principle. | Commercial pressure/threat. | “Economic pressure may amount to duress if illegitimate.” |
| Pao On v Lau Yiu Long | Duress factors include protest, alternatives, independent advice, and steps to avoid contract. | Party claims pressure invalidated agreement. | “The court will consider protest, alternatives and whether steps were taken to avoid.” |
| Universe Tankships v ITWF | Illegitimate pressure may amount to economic duress. | Threat causes party to pay/contract. | “The pressure may be illegitimate and therefore duress.” |
| Atlas Express v Kafco | Threat to breach contract can amount to economic duress. | Stronger party demands more money under pressure. | “The variation may be voidable because pressure left no practical choice.” |
| Williams v Bayley | Undue influence where pressure destroys free consent. | Family pressure/security for debt. | “Consent may not be free due to undue influence.” |
| Allcard v Skinner | Presumed undue influence in relationship of trust/confidence. | Religious/spiritual/fiduciary influence. | “The relationship may raise a presumption of undue influence.” |
| Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge | Banks must ensure surety receives independent advice in suspicious transactions. | Wife/relative guarantees another’s debt. | “The bank is put on inquiry and should ensure independent advice.” |
| Lloyds Bank v Bundy | Inequality of bargaining power may make transaction questionable. | Elderly/vulnerable person guarantees debt. | “The court may intervene where confidence and disadvantage are exploited.” |
14. Privity Cases
| Case | Main Principle | Apply When Facts Show | Exam-Use Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tweddle v Atkinson | Third party cannot enforce contract because they gave no consideration and are not party. | Beneficiary tries to sue. | “The claimant is a third party and cannot enforce at common law.” |
| Dunlop v Selfridge | Only parties to a contract can sue/be sued on it. | Manufacturer tries to enforce resale price. | “The doctrine of privity prevents enforcement by a non-party.” |
| Beswick v Beswick | Specific performance may help enforce promise benefiting third party through estate. | Widow/estate third-party benefit. | “Specific performance may overcome injustice caused by privity.” |
| Scruttons v Midland Silicones | Employees/agents may be protected only if conditions for agency exception are satisfied. | Exclusion clause extends to third party. | “The third party must show agency/consideration conditions are met.” |
| New Zealand Shipping v Satterthwaite, The Eurymedon | Himalaya clause can protect third-party carrier/stevedore if structured properly. | Shipping exclusion protects agents. | “The third party may rely on the clause if contractual machinery exists.” |
| Contracts Rights of Third Parties Act 1999 s1 | Third party may enforce if contract expressly says so or term purports to benefit them. | Named beneficiary or clear benefit. | “The third party may enforce under the 1999 Act.” |
15. Quick Best Case to Use Table
| Legal Issue | Best Cases / Authorities |
|---|---|
| Clear offer | Storer, Gibson |
| Advert as invitation to treat | Partridge, Fisher v Bell, Boots |
| Reward/unilateral offer | Carlill, Williams v Carwardine, R v Clarke |
| Counter-offer vs enquiry | Hyde v Wrench, Stevenson v McLean |
| Postal acceptance | Adams v Lindsell, Household Fire |
| Instant acceptance | Entores, Brinkibon |
| Revocation | Routledge v Grant, Byrne, Dickinson v Dodds |
| Domestic intention | Balfour, Merritt, Parker v Clark |
| Commercial intention | Edwards v Skyways, Rose and Frank, Esso |
| Past consideration | Roscorla, Re McArdle, Lampleigh, Re Casey |
| Existing duty | Collins, Glasbrook, Stilk, Hartley, Williams v Roffey |
| Part payment of debt | Pinnel, Foakes, High Trees, D & C Builders |
| Signed exclusion clause | L’Estrange, Curtis |
| Notice of exclusion clause | Olley, Thornton, Chapelton, Parker |
| Previous dealings | McCutcheon, Hollier, Spurling |
| Ambiguous exclusion clause | Houghton, Canada Steamship |
| Consumer unfair term | CRA 2015 ss62, 65, 68 |
| Condition/warranty | Poussard, Bettini |
| Innominate term | Hong Kong Fir |
| Exact performance | Cutter v Powell |
| Substantial performance | Hoenig, Bolton |
| Frustration | Taylor, Krell, Davis Contractors, Maritime National Fish |
| Damages aim | Robinson v Harman |
| Remoteness | Hadley, Victoria Laundry, The Heron II |
| Mitigation | British Westinghouse, Pilkington |
| Mental distress | Addis, Jarvis, Jackson, Farley |
| Specific performance | Beswick, Falcke, Sky Petroleum |
| Injunction | Lumley, Warner Bros, American Cyanamid |
| Minors’ necessaries | Nash, Chapple, SGA 1979 s3 |
| Beneficial service contract | Clements, De Francesco, Doyle |
| Voidable minor contracts | Steinberg, Edwards v Carter |
| Misrepresentation | Bisset, Smith, Redgrave, Derry, Hedley Byrne |
| Duress | Barton, Pao On, Atlas Express |
| Undue influence | Allcard, Etridge, Bundy |
| Privity | Tweddle, Dunlop, Beswick, 1999 Act |
16. Case Application Template
Use this every time you mention a case:
| Step | Template |
|---|---|
| Case | “In [case]…” |
| Principle | “…the court held that [principle].” |
| Link | “This is relevant because [fact from question].” |
| Outcome | “Therefore, [party] is likely/unlikely to [legal result].” |
Example:
In Stevenson v McLean, a mere enquiry did not destroy the original offer. This is relevant because Bilal only asked whether payment could be split, rather than rejecting ABC’s offer. Therefore, his reply is likely acceptance with a mere enquiry, not a counter-offer.
Written and Compiled By Sir Hunain Zia (AYLOTI), World Record Holder With 154 Total A Grades, 11 World Records and 7 Distinctions, Educate A Change.